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INTRODUCTION
There is a famous saying, “[i]f at first you don’t succeed, try, try,
again.”1 Recently, Louisiana landowners are taking this saying to heart.2
After having their legacy litigation3 claims denied by the courts, plaintiffs
have engineered a clever new tactic to resuscitate their claims: the citizen
suit.
Louisiana has a long-held, strong public interest in protecting against
environmental damage, which is reflected in the Louisiana Constitution.4
The Louisiana Constitution specifically states that the environment must
be “protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”5 Pursuant to
this policy, the legislature is required to set up procedures to protect the
environment.6 For this reason, the legislature has attempted to regulate and
protect the environment from the damaging effects of oil and gas
exploratory operations by implementing what are known as “citizen suit
provisions.”7
In 1940, the Louisiana State Legislature passed Act No. 157 in order
to regulate and promote the conservation of Louisiana’s gas and other

Copyright 2021, by ASHLEIGH ADAMS.
1. GREGORY Y. TITELMAN, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR
PROVERBS AND SAYINGS 151 (2nd ed. 1996).
2. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 1:18-cv-551, 2019 WL 3801647 (W.D.
La. Aug. 12, 2019); Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 404 F. Supp. 3d 993 (W.D. La. Aug.
12, 2019); Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267 So. 3d 96 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2018); Watson v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL
1311208 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2018).
3. Legacy litigation refers to hundreds of lawsuits brought by private
landowners seeking damages from oil and gas exploration companies for alleged
damage to their property. Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of
2006, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 347, 348 (2007).
4. Kenneth M. Murchison, Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State
Law: The Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, 57 LA. L. REV. 497, 497–98
(1997); see LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
5. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
6. See id.; Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at
997.
7. A citizen suit provision is when a private citizen is able to bring a direct
suit against one who has violated the law in lieu of the government or its agency
initiating the suit. Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 55–56 (1989).
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natural resources.8 Act No. 157 gives the Commissioner of Conservation
(“Commissioner”) the necessary authority to oversee and enforce the
environmental regulations of the state.9 Under this scheme of
conservation, Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 30:14 and 30:16 work
in tandem to provide legal recourse for violations resulting in
environmental damages.10
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:14 requires the Commissioner
to bring suit to restrain an individual “whenever it appears that a person is
violating or is threatening to violate a law of this state with respect to the
conservation of oil or gas, or both, or a provision of this Chapter, or a rule,
regulation, or order made thereunder.”11 Section 30:14 specifically
references illegal acts of moving and disposing of oil and gas products as
violations that the Commissioner is tasked with stopping and preventing.12
Under this regulatory scheme, the Commissioner is responsible for
ensuring that Louisiana’s environmental laws and regulations relating to
oil and gas development are followed.13
If the Commissioner fails to bring a suit against alleged violators,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16 becomes applicable.14 Under this
statute, an adversely affected individual who has previously notified the
Commissioner of a violation may themselves bring suit against the
violators to “prevent any or further violations” if the Commissioner does
not timely file suit.15 Section 30:16 expressly applies to ongoing and future
violations,16 but the effect of the statute regarding past violations remains
uncertain. As such, the language of section 30:16 has raised the issue of
exactly what type of violations give rise to a claim. Though a handful of
cases have raised the interpretation issue, the question of whether past
violations give rise to a valid claim under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:16 has not yet been determined.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, through dicta, has implied that private
landowners have the right to enforce regulations requiring the clean-up of
contaminated property at any time.17 However, this right, which stems
8. Act No. 157, 1940 La. Acts 610-629; Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d
495, 496 (La. 1942).
9. Hunter Co., 11 So. 2d at 496.
10. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 30:14, 30:16 (2019).
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:14.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. § 30:16.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 256 n.18 (La. 2010).
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from Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16, should not allow a citizen
to bring suit against a party who violated the regulation decades ago.18
Instead, to bring a claim for past environmental damages, the adversely
affected party should be required to bring a tort claim against the violator
within the one-year prescriptive period, which commences after the
landowner knew or should have known of the environmental violation, or
within ten years if the contamination arises from a breach of contract.19
This Comment will address the worrisome loophole recent litigation
has introduced under section 30:16, which potentially allows plaintiffs to
circumvent a legislative prescriptive period. To avoid prescription of
claims, some plaintiffs use citizen suit provisions as an alternate avenue to
maintain legacy litigation claims.20 This loophole could have troubling
implications for future legacy litigation cases, as well as for the future of
the oil and gas industry in Louisiana. For these reasons, legacy litigation
should not be allowed to be brought under the guise of section 30:16 in
order to prevent an action from being barred by a prescriptive period. In
fact, the very language of section 30:16 should be read to apply only to
ongoing violations and the threat of future violations.
The question that must be addressed is how Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:16 should be interpreted with regard to past violations.
As it stands now, courts in Louisiana avoid issuing rulings on whether
section 30:16 applies to past violations in hopes that the Louisiana
Supreme Court will rule on the matter.21 Labeling the violations as
“ongoing” provides a means of allowing the lower courts to sidestep
making a determination of what the law is with regards to section 30:16.
Forcing lower courts to decide this question of law on their own could
“significantly disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy for the
remediation of contaminated state land.”22 In order to avoid potential
abuse of the statute, the types of violations that create a cause of action
under section 30:16 must be determined by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the first wave of cases to address
the citizen suit provision issue, namely Global Marketing Solutions v. Blue
18. Id.
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2019); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3493.
20. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 1:18-cv-551, 2019 WL 3801647 (W.D.
La. Aug. 12, 2019); Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 404 F. Supp. 3d 993 (W.D. La.
2019); Watson v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL 1311208 (W.D.
La. Feb. 5, 2018); Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267 So. 3d 96 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
21. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d 993; Watson,
2018 WL 1311208; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d 96.
22. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *7.
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Mill Farms and Watson v. Arkoma Development, L.L.C.23 Part II will
address the second wave of cases from 2019, Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P.
and Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., taking specific note of the court’s
understanding of section 30:16 based on the set of 2018 cases and the
dynamic issues raised. Part III will provide a brief survey of how federal
courts have dealt with past violations of environmental regulations
brought as citizen suits. Finally, Part IV will offer a solution to the
application of section 30:16, based on the language of the statute and the
cases brought after 2018.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legacy Litigation
In Louisiana, legacy litigation is the traditional response to claims of
environmental damage wherein a private party is seeking damages from
past oil and gas exploration activities.24 This broad term encapsulates
hundreds of cases filed by property owners alleging environmental
damage caused by the exploratory actions of oil and gas companies25 that
have left an “unwanted ‘legacy’ in the form of actual or alleged
contamination.”26 These particular types of cases revolve around damage
that is often decades old, stemming from actions of the oil and gas
companies which have long since ceased.27 The main objective of legacy
litigation is to force the violator to pay for the expensive clean-up of the
contaminated land to ensure that the land is remediated to a standard
consistent with Louisiana’s Constitution.28
The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
determined that causes of action giving rise to a legacy litigation claim can
be tort claims when they are “continuous in nature where each individual
act would not necessarily give rise to a cause of action; but instead, the
cumulative effect of regularly occurring or continuous actions results in

23. Watson, 2018 WL 1311208; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So.3d 96.
24. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1 (La. 2010).
25. Id.
26. Pitre, supra note 3, at 348.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 349. Even though this objective and ability to force the violator to
pay has been heavily litigated and now regulated, for the purposes and scope of
this Comment, I am focusing on the citizen suit provisions. Act No. 312, 2006 La.
Acts 1472-1483; Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003).
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successive damages from day to day.”29 Under Louisiana law, delictual
legacy lawsuit claims are subject to a one-year prescriptive period.30
Furthermore, Louisiana Civil Code article 3493 establishes that the
prescriptive period for damages caused to an immovable begins to run the
day the owner knew, or should have known of the damages.31 However,
depending on the nature of the relationship between the private landowner
and the violator, legacy litigation may also be considered a contractual
claim.32 Many legacy litigation cases arise from previous mineral leases.33
If the claim is found to be contractual in nature, then the claim is subject
to a ten year prescriptive period.34 Regardless of whether the claim is
tortious or contractual, the plaintiff landowner is barred from bringing suit
once the applicable prescriptive period expires.
In addition to the applicable prescriptive period, legacy litigation
claims against oil and gas companies may also be barred by the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.35 It is well established jurisprudence that
a person who acquires ownership of the damaged property has no cause of
action against the third party for the damage inflicted unless the
subsequent purchaser received a subrogation36 of the rights of the owner
at the time the property was damaged.37 The Louisiana Supreme Court
applied the judicially created Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine in Eagle
Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, thereby establishing the effect of
this doctrine.38
In Eagle Pipe and Supply, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
legal right a person has against another to demand the performance of an
obligation is a personal right.39 While a real right40 can be asserted against
29. James v. New Century Mortg. Corp., No. 04-194, 2006 WL 2989242, at
*7 (W.D. La. Oct. 17, 2006).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2019).
31. Id. art. 3493.
32. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 256 (La. 2010).
33. Id.
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499.
35. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, 79 So. 3d 246, 256–57 (La.
2011).
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1825. Subrogation is the substitution of one person to
the rights of another.
37. Eagle Pipe & Supply, 79 So. 3d at 256–57; Clark v. J. L. Warner & Co.,
6 La. Ann. 408, 409 (1851).
38. Eagle Pipe & Supply, 79 So. 3d at 256–57.
39. Id. at 261.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. b (2019) (“real rights confer direct and
immediate authority over a thing”).
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anyone, a personal right is effective only between the parties involved.41
In recognizing the validity of the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine, the
Louisiana Supreme Court effectively restricted the ability of subsequent
purchasers to bring legacy litigation claims.42 However, the owner of the
damaged property may still have a claim against the seller, and the third
party tortfeasor may still be liable to the prior owner of the damaged
property.43
B. Citizen Suits
Citizen suits, which became prominent in the 1970s,44 are actions
instituted by private citizens to enforce a statute.45 A specific subset of
citizen suits are environmental citizen suits, whereby private citizens may
bring an action directly against the violator if the government or agency
fails to bring a timely suit.46 While the primary purpose of environmental
citizen suits is to protect the environment, these suits also help ensure that
the law is enforced.47
There are two types of environmental citizen suits: (1) an enforcing
citizen suit, in which a citizen brings an action directly against a private
individual or corporation for alleged environmental violations;48 and (2) a
citizen suit whereby a private citizen sues the governmental agency or
official tasked with enforcing the environmental rules and regulations due
to their failure to act against violators.49 The violations recognized under
environmental citizen suits are generally limited only to ongoing
violations.50

41. Eagle Pipe & Supply, 79 So. 3d at 261–62.
42. Id.
43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
44. Jane A. Jackson, Citizen Suits Under Environmental Statutes: Seeking
Guidance for a Recent Louisiana Trend, 65 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 229, 233
(2018).
45. Cross, supra note 7, at 55–56.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. STANLEY A. MILLAN et al., LOUISIANA ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE §
8:9 (2020), Westlaw LAPRAC-ENV.
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C. Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 30:14 and 30:16
Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 30:14 and 30:16 were enacted in
the 1940s, decades before the citizen suit was created.51 Despite there
being no express identification of either statute as a citizen suit provision,52
the statutes clearly fall into the modern understanding of a citizen suit
provision due to their “basic elements: standing, prior notice, and
violations.”53
Through the enactment of sections 30:14 and 30:16, the legislature
specifically created a mechanism for aggrieved property owners alleging
an environmental violation.54 These provisions were enacted to protect
Louisiana and its citizens from environmental harm.55 The Louisiana
Office of Conservation (“Office”) is charged with overseeing and
enforcing the environmental laws and regulations of the state that relate to
oil and gas actions.56 The Commissioner of Conservation
(“Commissioner”) is the head of the Office and, under section 30:14, is
the individual tasked with filing suit against violators.57 The
Commissioner must be remiss in his duties under section 30:14 for an
aggrieved party to have a claim under section 30:16.58 When an aggrieved
property owner files suit under section 30:16, he or she is effectively
stepping into the shoes of the Commissioner.59
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:14, the Commissioner
must bring suit to restrain an individual from violating or threatening to
violate Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation laws.60 The suit must be
initiated within a ten day period commencing when the Commissioner is
notified by the adversely affected party.61 The Commissioner may seek
either a prohibitory or mandatory injunction against the violator.62 A

51. Act No. 157, 1940 La. Acts 610-629; Jackson, supra note 44, at 233.
52. Jackson, supra note 44, at 233.
53. Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 11 So. 2d 495, 496 (La. 1942).
54. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 1:18-cv-551, 2019 WL 3801647, at *3
(W.D. La. Aug. 12, 2019); Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 404 F. Supp. 3d 993, 997
(W.D. La. Aug. 12, 2019).
55. Cross, supra note 7, at 55–56.
56. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647 at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
57. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647 at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
58. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647 at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
59. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647 at *3; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
60. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:14 (2019).
61. Id. § 30:16.
62. Id. § 30:14.
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prohibitory injunction is preventative, restorative, or protective;63 it is
meant to stop an individual from violating or causing harm by creating an
order prohibiting the individual from doing so.64 Alternatively, a
mandatory injunction compels the violating party to take action to redress
the damages from a violation that has already occurred.65 When granted
based upon a citizen suit provision, mandatory injunctions can be used to
require a party to pay clean-up fees.66
If the Commissioner fails to bring suit against the violator within ten
days of receiving notification of the violation, the landowner adversely
affected by the environmental violation(s) may bring suit to stop any
current violations, or further violations, under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:16.67 The language of section 30:16 indicates that the statute
unequivocally applies to ongoing violations and threats of future
violations of conservation regulations, though there is uncertainty
regarding its applicability to past violations.68
There are few cases involving section 30:16 found in Louisiana
jurisprudence.69 This lack of case law makes the appropriate application
of section 30:16 uncertain.70 While the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet
to rule on the issue, the Court has hinted at what types of violations may
be addressed through a citizen suit under section 30:16.71 In a footnote at
the end of its opinion in Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the court noted that:
[O]ne of the reasons we granted this writ was to determine
whether a subsequent purchaser has the right to sue for property
damages that occurred before he purchased the property,
particularly where the damage was not overt. However, we need
not reach that determination in this case because, assuming the
Breauxs had a right as a subsequent purchaser to sue in tort for
property damage, that right has prescribed. Further, we note that
regardless of who has standing to pursue claims for money
damages, the current owner of property always has the right to
63. Comment, Injunction—Mandatory Or Prohibitory?, 25 YALE L.J. 589,
590 (1916).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions To
Require The Payment Of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 623, 674 (1990).
67. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:16 (2019).
68. Id.
69. Jackson, supra note 44, at 232.
70. Id.
71. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 256 n.18 (La. 2010).
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seek a regulatory clean-up of a contaminated site.72
The Louisiana Supreme Court treated Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp. as a
simple legacy litigation case, finding that the plaintiff’s right to bring a
delictual claim had prescribed.73 The Court ultimately abstained from
making a decision on whether past violations of conservation regulations
would result in a valid claim under section 30:16, but the Court did seem
to recognize the right of a private landowner to seek the enforcement of
conservation regulations requiring violators to return the land to its
previous quality.74
However, this recognition is merely dicta.75 Still, it should be treated
as possible insight into how the Louisiana Supreme Court may rule on this
issue if or when presented with it in the future.76
II. JURISPRUDENCE
A. Novel Use of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16: The First
Wave
1. Global Marketing Solutions v. Blue Mill Farms
Global Marketing Solutions v. Blue Mill Farms was originally brought
as a legacy litigation suit with the plaintiff asserting tortious and
contractual claims against the defendant.77 The plaintiff (“Global”) was a
private landowner who filed suit against former mineral lessees whose
leases predated his ownership of the land.78 Global alleged damages from
the drilling actions of the defendants. Global was not the owner of the land
when the damaging acts allegedly occurred.79 In fact, Global never even
had mineral rights to the property in question as the property became
subject to a mineral servitude in the 1930s.80 The trial court found that the
Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine from Eagle Pipe clearly barred suit based

72. Id.
73. Id. at 262.
74. Id. at 256 n.18.
75. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935).
76. Id.
77. Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267 So. 3d 96, 98 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2018).
78. Id. at 97.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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on legacy litigation grounds, and therefore granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants.81
Global then filed a fifth supplemental and amended petition to include
sections 30:14 and 30:16.82 Global sought both prohibitory and mandatory
injunctions, alleging that the toxic waste in the soil amounted to
environmental violations, including violations of Statewide Order 29-B.83
Global attached two letters84 to its petition to show that it properly notified
the Commissioner as required by section 30:14, and also to show its intent
to file suit against the defendants under section 30:16 if the Commissioner
failed to do so.85
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
the case back to the district court to allow the litigation to proceed under
section 30:16.86 The majority opinion held that the “violations at issue—
namely, the failure to remediate the property—[were] still ongoing.”87
Concurring with the majority opinion, Judge Holdridge concentrated
on the perceived contradiction of sections 30:14 and 30:16.88 Judge
Holdridge stated that the language of the statutes, when read in pari
materia, is ambiguous and can be seen as authorizing suit for a broader
range of violations than explicitly given in section 30:16.89
Judge Holdridge did agree with the defendants that the language of
section 30:16 only authorizes citizen suits for ongoing or threatened
violations.90 Judge Holdridge stated that there are “other procedural
actions available to the parties to more completely address this apparent
inconsistency,”91 such as traditional legacy litigation.92

81. Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, 79 So. 3d 246, 256–57 (La.
2011); Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
82. Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
83. Id. Statewide Order 29-B refers to a subsection of the Louisiana
Administrative Code Title 43 that provides general operations guidelines for
natural resources from the Office of Conservation. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43,
pt. 19, §§ 101–641 (2010).
84. Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 101.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 102 (Holdridge, J., concurring).
89. Keith B. Hall & Colleen C. Jarrott, 1st Circuit Allows Legacy Suit to
Proceed as Citizen Suit, 66 LA. B.J. 372, 372–73 (2019).
90. Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 102 (Holdridge, J., concurring).
91. Id.
92. E-mail from Guy Holdridge, Judge, La. First Circuit Court of Appeal, to
author (Oct. 31, 2019) (on file with author).
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Judge Guidry dissented from the majority opinion, stating that the
plaintiff’s allegations were based on wholly past actions and were not
appropriate under section 30:16.93 He noted that the plain meaning of the
law did not allow for this type of violation to create a cause of action under
section 30:16.94
2. Watson v. Arkoma Development, L.L.C.
In Watson v. Arkoma Development, L.L.C., the defendants’ oil and gas
exploration and production activities allegedly damaged property
belonging to the plaintiff.95 These exploratory actions commenced in the
1920s.96 The plaintiff alleged that oil field waste was improperly disposed
of in unlined earthen pits97 leading to the contamination of the land.98 The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging no cause of action under
section 30:16 because the statute does not provide a remedy for past
violations.99
Magistrate Judge Karen Hayes recommended granting the motion to
dismiss most of the plaintiff’s claims.100 She believed that the “Good
Samaritan Doctrine”101 claim should be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s
93. Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 101 (Guidry, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Watson v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL 1311208, at *1
(W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2018).
96. Id.
97. Unlined earthen pits are banned in Louisiana by an Amendment to
Statewide Order 29-B. See Amendment to Statewide Order No. 29-B, 12 La. Reg.
26 (Jan. 20, 1986) (codified at LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19).
98. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *1.
99. Id.
100. Id. at *2–8 (including the plaintiff’s claim under Civil Code article 667,
his claim under Civil Code articles 2317 and 2322, his claim under Civil Code
article 2688, his claim of unjust enrichment of the defendants, his claim under Act
312, his claim of fraud and his claim of land loss and subsidence damages, all
were recommended to be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to adequately
plead his claims).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
The “Good Samaritan Doctrine” states that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for
physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect [perform] his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or
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failure to plead facts proving that the defendants rendered services to
him.102 She also recommended that the plaintiff’s claims of continuing tort
and continuing trespass be dismissed, as Global failed to sufficiently plead
a theory of either.103
Magistrate Judge Hayes did, however, state that the plaintiff’s causes
of action arising from unauthorized saltwater disposal and injection and
breach of express lease terms should be allowed to proceed.104 She
recommended that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied, as the
plaintiff was “alleg[ing] an ongoing violation, not a past violation.”105
Therefore, she believed that the court did not have to determine whether
section 30:16 applies to past violations.106 In doing so, Magistrate Judge
Hayes effectively side-stepped the issue and did not attempt to weigh in
on this same issue that the Louisiana Supreme Court has yet to address.107
The district court entered a judgment consistent with the recommendation
of Judge Hayes.108
3. Analysis
In both Global Marketing Solutions and Watson, the plaintiffs initially
attempted to bring suit on more traditional grounds, through simple legacy
litigation.109 Those grounds were barred by the Subsequent Purchaser
Doctrine and their respective prescriptive periods.110 The claims under
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16 were a supplemental method of
receiving remediation for the alleged environmental damages to the
properties.111 Finding ongoing violations in lieu of finding past violations

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third
person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
102. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *2–3.
103. Id. at *4.
104. Id. at *2–10.
105. Id. at *10–11.
106. Hall & Jarrott, supra note 89, at 372–73.
107. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *10.
108. Hall & Jarrott, supra note 89, at 372–73.
109. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070; Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms,
267 So. 3d 96 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
110. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *1; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
111. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *1; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
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allowed both courts to avoid having to weigh in on whether section 30:16
is applicable to past violations.112
These two cases illustrate the controversies that the language of
section 30:16 has created among the jurisprudence. In light of the statute’s
ambiguous nature, judges have differing opinions on how to interpret the
law but seem willing to stretch the law in order to find a result they feel is
equitable. Without allowing the suits to be brought under section 30:16,
the plaintiffs in both Global and Watson would have been barred due to
strict prescriptive periods and the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.
In finding that these past acts constitute an ongoing violation, courts
have allowed legacy litigation to go forward under the guise of section
30:16.113 Since the damages caused by past violations have never been
corrected, the courts found the failure to decontaminate the land was an
ongoing violation.114 However, this result does not seem to follow the
actual language of the statute, as the contamination is not being
continuously done by the defendants. In fact, the actions that caused the
damages have long since ceased.115 The courts are opening the floodgates
for litigation under this interpretation of section 30:16. All legacy litigation
suits that are otherwise barred by a prescriptive period or the Subsequent
Purchaser Doctrine are now viable. Applying the logic behind this ruling,
as long as the contaminated land remains in its damaged state, a plaintiff
need only allege damages caused by environmental violations, no matter
when the violations occurred.
B. Novel Use of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16: The Second
Wave
Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P. and Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P. are the two
most recent appellate cases brought under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:16.116 While the defendants in both cases are the same parties
(“BEPCO”), the plaintiffs are different private landowners who both
owned land in the Eola Oil & Gas Field in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana.117
112. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *10; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d
at 101.
113. Hall & Jarrott, supra note 89, at 372–73.
114. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *10; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d
at 101.
115. Watson, 2018 WL 6274070, at *1; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 97.
116. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 1:18-cv-551, 2019 WL 3801647 (W.D.
La. Aug. 12, 2019); Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 404 F. Supp. 3d 993 (W.D. La.
2019).
117. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
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These two cases illustrate the issues courts are having in determining
whether past violations create a claim under the statute. Both opinions
were delivered on the same day in the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana by Judge Dee Drell.118 The majority opinions are
identical.119
1. Factual History
Guilbeau and Tureau are legacy litigation cases wherein the plaintiffs
sought an injunction against the defendants for alleged contamination to
their property caused by previous oil and gas exploration.120 In both cases,
the plaintiffs alleged that BEPCO drilled on adjacent land and caused
contamination from BEPCO’s oil and gas wells.121 The plaintiffs also
alleged that the defendants left unlined earthen pits122 that were either not
closed at all, or were not closed properly in compliance with Statewide
Order 29-B.123
On August 31, 2016, both plaintiffs alerted the Commissioner about
the violations and requested that he file suit under section 30:14.124 The
plaintiffs then sent a follow-up letter to the Commissioner dated
September 27, 2016, indicating their intent to file suit under section 30:16
if the Commissioner failed to file suit.125
Ultimately, the Commissioner did not file suit under section 30:14
within the allotted period.126 In response, Tureau filed suit under section
30:16 on September 14, 2017, and Guilbeau on September 15, 2017.127 In
both cases, the defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6)128 motion to dismiss.129
Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes recommended that the defendants’
Motions to Dismiss both be denied.130
118. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d 993.
119. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d 993.
120. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
121. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
122. Unlined earthen pits are banned in Louisiana by an Amendment to
Statewide Order 29-B. See Amendment to Statewide Order No. 29-B, 12 La. Reg.
26 (Jan. 20, 1986) (codified at LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19).
123. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
124. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
125. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
126. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 994.
127. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 995.
128. This is a motion to dismiss based on a failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
129. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 995.
130. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *2; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 995.

350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd 221

2/25/21 8:41 AM

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

218

[Vol. IX

The emergence of using section 30:16 to bring suit for past violations
is a relatively new development in Louisiana.131 Litigators are attempting
to bring legacy litigation suits that are otherwise barred.132 This attempt to
bring legacy litigation under section 30:16 is in response to the heavy
limitation on legacy litigation implemented by Marin v. Exxon Mobil
Corp. and Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp.133 Judge Drell
stated that plaintiffs have now begun “recalibrating their efforts” in an
attempt to save the viability of legacy litigation suits.134 For this reason,
Global Marketing Solutions and Watson are hailed as the “new wave of
litigation” following this new trend.135
In both Tureau and Guilbeau, a section 30:16 claim was only asserted
after the plaintiffs’ legacy litigation cases were dismissed.136 Judge Drell
examined the rationale of the decision from the first wave of this novel use
of the citizen suit and its expansion of section 30:16.137 However, after
much analysis, the BEPCO decisions still avoided actually deciding
whether this was the correct conclusion.138
2. Reasoning of the Court
In both cases, the court abstained—under the Burford Doctrine139—
from making a decision on whether Louisiana Revised Statutes section

131. See Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d 993; Watson
v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL 1311208 (W.D. La. Feb. 5,
2018); Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267 So. 3d 96 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2018).
132. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *3; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
133. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *3; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
134. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *4; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
135. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *4; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998–
1000.
136. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *4; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
137. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *4; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
138. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
139. Burford Doctrine: Where timely and adequate state-court review is
available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the
proceedings or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are
“difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar”; or (2)
where the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to
a matter of substantial public concern.” Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 318
(1943).
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30:16 is applicable to past violations.140 The court gave a detailed
reasoning for its decision to abstain.141
The court held that while the Louisiana Supreme Court is the only
Louisiana court able to determine the correct interpretation of the law, it
has yet to rule on the issue, thereby leaving it open for other courts to
attempt to interpret the law.142 Though there have been decisions from the
First Circuit Court of Appeals, those decisions are not binding on other
courts of equal or greater rank.143
The only indication of how the Louisiana Supreme Court would
possibly rule comes from a footnote in Marin,144 but this footnote is merely
dicta.145 The court reasoned that since there is no ruling from the Louisiana
Supreme Court on the “novel use of the statute,” the court must attempt an
Erie guess.146 Therefore, under the Burford Doctrine, the court decided to
abstain from interpreting the statute as it is too entangled in the issue of
state policy and the public welfare.147
3. Analysis
The BEPCO cases laid out the State’s interests in having the
interpretation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16 settled by the
Louisiana Supreme Court: (1) the future of the oil and gas industry; and
(2) the future of legacy litigation.148 These State interests make the
statute’s applicability an important unanswered question. If section 30:16
is found to apply to past violations, it may potentially undo the limitations
on oil and gas legacy suits previously implemented by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, such as the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.149
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
recognized that section 30:16 has been used in this new context only after
140. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
141. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *2–8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 996–
1002.
142. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1002.
143. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
144. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 256 n.18 (La. 2010).
145. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
146. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1000. An
Erie guess refers to a federal court making an educated determination of how it
believes that the applicable state’s highest court would resolve the issue if
presented with it. See American Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. Canal Indem.
Co., 352 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir. 2003).
147. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1001–02.
148. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1001–02.
149. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1002.

350308-LSU_EL_9-1_Text.indd 223

2/25/21 8:41 AM

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

220

[Vol. IX

previous legacy litigation claims failed.150 The court’s acknowledgement
of this fact indicates that the guise under which legacy litigation
masquerades as a citizen suit is flimsy at best. The violations were referred
to as “present-day contamination caused by those historical activities”151
by the BEPCO court, indicating that it views them as wholly past
violations, unlike the courts in Global Marketing Solutions and Watson,
who found failures to remediate constitute ongoing violations.152 This fact
alone furthers the worrisome nature of allowing legacy litigation claims to
be brought under section 30:16 as it is a blatant attempt to manipulate the
legal system to benefit individuals who otherwise do not have a claim.
The Western District’s concern that if section 30:16 does not apply to
past violations, the state’s interest in protecting the environment could be
harmed, is easily mitigated.153 Future and ongoing violations would still
be able to be litigated under the statute. As long as suits are timely filed,
Louisiana’s interest in protecting the environment will not be adversely
affected by prescriptive periods. The importance of coherence of state
policy furthers the need for a clear determination of whether this statute
applies to past violations.154 This leaves an unanswered question that could
potentially impact the state and its environmental interests.
III. FEDERAL TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
Federal treatment of environmental citizen suits is highly influenced
by Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.155
Prior to Gwaltney, many federal courts, but not all, allowed suits to be
brought for past violations.156 This dichotomy led to a split among the
150. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *4; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
151. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *1; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 995.
152. Watson v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL 1311208, at
*10–11 (W.D. La. Feb. 5, 2018); Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267
So. 3d 96, 101 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
153. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *8; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1002.
154. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647, at *6; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
155. Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme and Variations in Statutory Preclusions Against
Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA And Citizens – Part One:
Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 491
(2004).
156. See Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., 756 F.2d 392, 396 (5th
Cir. 1985); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, 604 F.2d 1008, 1014
(7th Cir. 1979); see also Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and remanded, 484 U.S. 49 (1987);
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 635 F. Supp. 284
(N.D.N.Y. 1986); Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp.
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district courts on the issue, resulting in confusion for individuals wanting
to file suit against a violator.157 Gwaltney became the seminal case for a
narrow interpretation of citizen suit provisions and has since been used to
interpret other environmental citizen suit provisions.158 Gwaltney set the
standard for how to treat past violations when the language of the statute
only explicitly mentions ongoing violations of environmental laws or
regulations.159
A. Background
Gwaltney dealt with a federal environmental citizen suit provision
contained in the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).160 Specifically, the case
discussed whether past violations gave rise to a cause of action under the
CWA.161 The defendant allegedly violated the CWA by exceeding the
effluent limitations on pollutants numerous times.162 The last violation
occurred almost two years prior to when the plaintiff filed suit.163 The
defendant moved for dismissal, arguing that the violations were wholly
past violations and as such, did not fall within the scope of the CWA.164
The district and appellate court both found in favor of the plaintiff,
concluding that section 505 of the CWA did in fact allow for suit to be
brought for wholly past violations of the Act.165
Upon granting writs, the United States Supreme Court held that the
best way to determine the meaning of section 505 was to look to the
207 (D. Conn. 1985); SPIRG of N.J. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 615 F. Supp. 1419
(D.N.J. 1985); Cross, supra note 7, at 63.
157. Miller, supra note 155, at 491.
158. Cross, supra note 7, at 63; Miller, supra note 155, at 491; see also Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
159. Cross, supra note 7, at 63; Miller, supra note 155, at 491.
160. The Clean Water Act (“CWA”) was enacted to “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.” 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1250–1387 (2018).
161. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 53–54 (1987). Clean Water Act § 505(a) states in part that a private citizen
may bring suit “against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation.” 33
U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018).
162. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 53.
163. Id. at 54.
164. Id. at 55.
165. Id. at 56.
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language of the statute itself, which was determined to mean only ongoing
and future violations.166 In applying this meaning, the Court held that in
order to bring a citizen suit under section 505, the plaintiff must “allege a
state of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable
likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.”167
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that the “to be in violation”
language of section 505 of the CWA signaled that past violations were
included in the types of violations that triggered the ability to bring suit.168
The Court worried that allowing citizen suits for wholly past violations
would undermine the Administrator’s enforcement discretion and could
become potentially intrusive.169 The Court felt that this interpretation
would not be in line with the intent of Congress, as it would disrupt the
“supplementary role” of citizen suits.170 The Court concluded that if
Congress had intended such an interpretation, the language of section 505
would specifically include past violations.171
After Gwaltney, the bar remained relatively low to be able to bring a
citizen suit—litigants were only required to show, in good faith, that a
recurrence of the violation was likely.172 Likewise, in order to defeat the
claim, “the defendant [had to] demonstrate that it [was] absolutely clear
that the alleged wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.”173
In 1990, Congress amended section 505 to include the phrase “who is
alleged to have violated,” thereby specifically including past violations
under the scope of the statute and allowing for the payment of the cleanup costs.174
B. Analysis
The Court took a conservative approach in its interpretation of the
CWA, and such an analysis indicates the Court’s desire to show deference
to the acts of Congress.175 The Court’s employment of a plain reading of
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 60–61.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Cross, supra note 7, at 63.
173. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 66 (quoting United States v.
Phosphate Export Ass'n, Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis in Gwaltney)).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2018).
175. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 60–61.
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the text led to the conclusion that past violations do not give a rise to a
cause of action under the CWA, and that this must be the result that
Congress intended due to the language.176
The later amendment of the CWA after Gwaltney clearly indicated the
intent of Congress to include wholly past violations within the scope of
the statute.177 With this amendment, the interpretation by the Supreme
Court seems even more compelling. The alteration of the statute to include
past violations gives weight to the argument of following the plain
meaning of a statute unless there is Congressional direction otherwise. In
following the plain meaning, the Court refused to overextend its power by
too broadly interpreting the intent of Congress. Congress has the power, at
any time, to alter the language of a statute to explicitly state the result
Congress desires. While even the highest Court can only rule on what the
law is in front of it, Congress can ultimately supersede the Court’s
understanding of a statute by updating the statute’s language, which is
exactly what Congress did.
The Court’s reasoning in Gwaltney is applicable when determining
how to interpret Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16 because the
statute does not specifically mention applying to past violations, just as
Section 505 of the CWA did not expressly provide for past violations in
Gwaltney. For this reason, it must be inferred that the legislature intended
the statute to be read as written. If the legislature intended a different
result, the legislature has the sole authority to amend the statute at any time
to include past violations.
IV. PROPOSED APPLICATION OF LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES SECTION
30:16
This Comment proposes that Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16
should only apply to ongoing and future violations. There are three major
factors in this consideration: (1) the language of section 30:16; (2) the
purpose of prescriptive periods and judicially created bars to suit; and (3)
the alternative remedies available under section 30:16.
A. Language of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16
As the Court explained in Gwaltney, the explicit language of any
statute is the most logical place to start when discerning how to properly
apply the law.178 Statutes are the expression of legislative will and as such,
176. Id.
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
178. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 57.
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the language should reflect legislative intent.179 The text of Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:16 does not explicitly provide for the inclusion
of past violations as a means to bring suit under the statute.180 Instead,
ongoing and future violations are the only types of violations specifically
mentioned in section 30:16.181 It is not the inclusion of ongoing and future
violations in the language of section 30:16, but the exclusion of past
violations from this language that speaks volumes. If the legislature
intended for section 30:16 to apply to past violations, the language of the
statute would indicate that by adding the phrase, “past violations.” It
should be assumed that the legislature was careful in its wording of section
30:16, and was intentional with the words chosen.182
If the language of section 30:16 is found to be ambiguous by a court,
Louisiana Civil Code articles 10 and 11 will apply.183 Louisiana Civil
Code article 10 states that when the language of a statute is susceptible to
numerous meanings, the statute should be interpreted in the way that best
conforms to the purpose of the statute.184 Furthermore, Louisiana Civil
Code article 11 provides that when the language of the statute is unclear,
the language of the statute should be given its general meaning.185 Section
30:16 works in tandem with section 30:14 to protect the environment.186
These statutes seek to prevent violations of Louisiana’s environmental
laws and regulations.187 Therefore, because the purpose of section 30:16 is
to be preventative, ongoing and future violations should be the only
violations applicable under the statute. To extend the statute’s application
to a wholly past violation would not serve the preventative purpose of
section 30:16.
Section 30:16 expressly provides that ongoing and future violations
trigger a right to bring suit, making no mention at all of wholly past
violations.188 Applying Louisiana Civil Code article 11, the two expressly
provided types of violations are the only ones that are to be included in the
scope of the statute.
It can also be argued that the language of the statute is not ambiguous.
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 9, if “a law is clear and unambiguous
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
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and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be
applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of
the intent of the legislature.”189 Using this standard, the language of the
statute would not permit retroactive application, but instead would only
allow for current and prospective application as the statute only expressly
provides for future and ongoing violations.190
There are also arguments that can be made that a literal reading is not
the most appropriate way to interpret the section 30:16. While the
legislature may want to allow people to bring a claim against those that
have damaged the land of private property owners, this avenue has already
been limited by the relevant prescriptive periods and the Subsequent
Purchaser Doctrine.191 However, the legislature has the ability, at any time,
to change the legislation to reflect an intent to allow claims for past
violations. Gwaltney is a perfect example of how this can and should work,
especially considering the similarities between the question of whether
either statute applies to past violations, though neither expressly provides
for that application in the language of the statute. Therefore, a literal
reading of the statute seems to be the most prudent way to determine its
meaning.
The statute’s present tense is another factor that supports this proposed
application.192 Section 30:16 is written solely in the present tense,
indicating that it is merely meant to be a preventative or a corrective
measure for future and ongoing violations.193 The statute provides an
aggrieved landowner the ability to bring suit to “prevent any or further
violations.”194 This is indicative that only ongoing and future violations
were contemplated when this statute was enacted.195
B. Purpose of Prescriptive Periods and Judicially Created Bars to Suit
The four Louisiana cases previously discussed in this Comment have
each sought to take advantage of what is essentially a loophole under
section 30:16. Without a broad interpretation of section 30:16, these cases

189. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9.
190. Id.
191. Id. arts. 3492–93; Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, 79 So.
3d 246, 256–57 (La. 2011).
192. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:16.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 9.
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would not have been viable.196 Each claim would have been barred, either
due to the respective prescriptive periods or the Subsequent Purchaser
Doctrine.197 Global Marketing Solutions and Watson were not even
originally brought under section 30:16, but rather were brought as legacy
litigation claims that were ultimately barred for the aforementioned
reasons.198
In creating a means to evade prescriptive periods, section 30:16 causes
injustice. Prescriptive periods provide a finite amount of time within which
a case must be brought.199 This period of time is intended to represent a
reasonable amount of time for both the plaintiff and the defendant.200 The
purpose of a prescriptive period is to allow for a fair and level playing field
so that a defendant is not surprised by suit years after an injury occurs.201
Furthermore, if a claim is allowed to be brought a significant time later,
the evidence that a defendant might need to defeat the allegation may no
longer be available or reliable.202 A plaintiff with a valid claim is expected
to pursue that claim with reasonable diligence.203 Prescriptive periods
prevent stale claims from being brought and help to protect from
inequitable results.204
Additionally, the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine is a judicially
created bar to filing suit that has greatly impacted legacy litigation.205 By
enacting this doctrine, the Louisiana Supreme Court greatly narrowed the
scope of legacy litigation.206 The introduction of the requirement of
assignment or subrogation of the rights of the previous owner into legacy
litigation was a purposeful move by the Court to provide protection to third
parties accused of contaminating land years ago and to prevent the unjust
196. Guilbeau v. BEPCO, L.P., No. 1:18-cv-551, 2019 WL 3801647 (W.D.
La. Aug. 12, 2019); Tureau v. BEPCO, L.P., 404 F. Supp. 3d 993 (W.D. La.
2019); Watson v. Arkoma Dev., L.L.C., No. 17-1331, 2018 WL 1311208 (W.D.
La. Feb. 5, 2018); Global Marketing Sols. v. Blue Mill Farms, 267 So. 3d 96 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2018).
197. Guilbeau, 2019 WL 3801647; Tureau, 404 F. Supp. 3d 993; Watson,
2018 WL 1311208; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d 96.
198. Watson, 2018 WL 1311208, at *1; Global Marketing Sols., 267 So. 3d at 98.
199. FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., TORT LAW—THE AMERICAN AND LOUISIANA
PERSPECTIVES 355 (3rd ed. 2017).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Eagle Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess, 79 So.3d 246, 256–57 (La.
2011).
206. Id. at 261–62.
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enrichment of the plaintiff.207 As the Louisiana Supreme Court expressed
in Eagle Pipe, “the law does not provide to the Subsequent Purchaser a
source of profit by allowing him to negotiate a low purchase price based
on the condition of the property and the right to seek damages from the
tortfeasor who is responsible for the property's poor condition.”208
Allowing these tort and breach of contract claims to be brought under
a statute meant to serve Louisiana’s interest in conservation undermines
the very purpose of having prescriptive periods and other judicially created
means of barring suit.209 By broadly interpreting section 30:16 to include
past violations, numerous legacy litigation claims that are barred by
prescriptive periods or the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine will now be
viable. This result is in direct contradiction to the purpose of having these
bars to begin with and will open the floodgates of litigation.
C. Applicability of Remedies Available Under Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 30:16
There are two remedies available to plaintiffs under Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 30:16: prohibitory injunctions and mandatory
injunctions.210 However, a prohibitory injunction is not appropriate for
past violations, because the only remedy for this type of injunction is an
order to an individual to not do something in the future.211 As such, the
preventative nature of prohibitory injunctions offers no relief for past
violations that have damaged property. Additionally, mandatory
injunctions should not be applicable to past violations either, due to the
intent behind the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine.
Issuing a mandatory injunction for past violations would essentially
order the past violator to pay the expensive fees for the cleanup of the
contaminated land. Allowing a past violation to give rise to a cause of
action under section 30:16 would authorize a plaintiff to sue a violator for
an act that took place prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition of the land.212 This
would mean that the plaintiff would have only owned the land in its
contaminated state, and therefore, the current landowner would be
“restored” to a situation that they had never had previously, giving them
an unexpected windfall. The inequity in issuing mandatory injunctions for
past violations under section 30:16 cannot be denied. It would be against
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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public policy to allow a plaintiff to be unduly enriched by buying
contaminated land cheaply and then forcing the violator to pay for the
cleanup of their past violations, thereby unjustly enriching the buyer. This
would be in direct violation of the intent behind the Subsequent Purchaser
Doctrine.213
The inappropriateness of these two remedies applying to past
violations under section 30:16 further strengthens the argument that past
violations should not be allowed under the statute.
CONCLUSION
A fair reading of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:16, combined
with the underlying purpose of prescriptive periods and the Subsequent
Purchaser Doctrine, supports the determination that section 30:16 applies
only to future and ongoing violations, and does not apply to past
environmental violations. The new trend of bringing legacy litigation
under section 30:16 is merely a means to circumvent prescriptive periods
and the Subsequent Purchaser Doctrine. The uncertainty among lower
courts on how to interpret the statute necessitates either a ruling from the
Louisiana Supreme Court interpreting the law or an amendment by the
legislature to clarify its intent. If the Louisiana Legislature fails to make
this clarification, then if, and when, the Louisiana Supreme Court is
presented with this issue, the Court should determine that the rights
provided under the statute do not extend to past violations of
environmental laws and regulations.
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